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Minding the Gap:
Why and How Nova Scotia Should Enact a New
Cyber-safety Act
Case Comment on Crouch v. Snell
By Jennifer Taylor*
INTRODUCTION
Nova Scotia’s Cyber-safety Act1 was meant to fill a gap in the law.2 Where
criminal charges and civil claims like defamation were unavailable or
undesirable, the Act, it was hoped, would contain a substantive definition of
cyberbullying, set out when it was actionable, and provide procedures for victims
to obtain remedies. But the statute that was ultimately passed was too blunt a
tool to address the problem, from both a substantive and a procedural
perspective.
That helps explain why Justice McDougall of the Supreme Court of Nova
Scotia struck down the entire statute as unconstitutional, in the recent case of
Crouch v. Snell.3 Now that the Cyber-safety Act is no more, the gap is back. Since
the statute was enacted, in 2013, there have been amendments to the Criminal
Code4 and developments in tort law5 that arguably temper the need for a revised
statute.
So is there still a gap that needs filling? This case comment suggests that there
is, in light of the continued prevalence of harmful online speech — but only if it is
filled properly. In filling the gap the second time around, the Legislature should
take some cues from Justice McDougall’s decision which, though not perfect,
* Research Lawyer, Stewart McKelvey, Halifax NS. Email: jennifertaylor@stewartmck-
elvey.com. The impetus for this comment was a blog post on the Stewart McKelvey
website, cross-published on CanLII Connects and in the February 2016 edition of
Internet and E-Commerce Law in Canada (Vol 16, No 10), LexisNexis Canada. See
Jennifer Taylor, ‘‘Striking Down the Cyber-safety Act: The 10 Most Interesting Things
aboutCrouch v Snell” (16December 2015), online:<http://www.stewartmckelvey.com/
en/home/resources/publications/strikingdownthenovascotiacybersafetyactthe10mosti-
n.aspx#visibility> and <http://canliiconnects.org/en/commentaries/39596>.
1 Cyber-safety Act, S.N.S. 2013, c. 2 [alternatively, ‘‘the Act”].
2 NovaScotia,House ofAssembly,Hansard, 61stAssembly, 5thSess, 13-32 (10May2013)
at 2514 (Hon Marilyn More).
3 Crouch v. Snell, 2015 NSSC 340, 2015 CarswellNS 995 (N.S. S.C.).
4 See e.g. the new offence of publication of an intimate image without consent in section
162.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
5 See e.g. Jane Doe 464533 v. D. (N.), 2016 ONSC 541, 2016 CarswellOnt 911 (Ont.
S.C.J.), which established in Ontario the tort of ‘‘public disclosure of private facts”: see
para. 46.
lays the groundwork for what reasonable limits on the substantive definition of
‘‘cyberbullying,” and reasonable tweaks to the process, should look like.
I. REVIEW OF THE CYBER-SAFETY ACT
The soul of the Cyber-safety Act was the definition of cyber-bullying:
Interpretation
3 (1) In this Act,
(b) ‘‘cyberbullying” means any electronic communication through
the use of technology including, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, computers, other electronic devices, social networks,
text messaging, instant messaging, websites and electronic mail,
typically repeated or with continuing effect, that is intended or
ought reasonably [to] be expected to cause fear, intimidation,
humiliation, distress or other damage or harm to another person’s
health, emotional well-being, self-esteem or reputation, and
includes assisting or encouraging such communication in any
way[.]
The two main pillars of the Cyber-safety Act rested on this definitional
foundation:6
. Part I — Protection Orders: Part I set out the procedure to apply to a
justice of the peace for an ex parte protection order against an alleged
cyberbully. The ‘‘subject” of cyberbullying could apply for this order
himself or herself; if the subject was a ‘‘minor” then their parent, a police
officer, or another designated person would have to apply on their behalf.
The protection order could include, inter alia, a provision restricting the
respondent from communicating with the subject. An order would have to
be served on the respondent, and reviewed by the Supreme Court, which
would have powers to revise or revoke it.
. Part II — Liability for Cyberbullying: Part II established the tort of
cyberbullying, and outlined the available remedies if liability was proven
(including remedies against the parent of a defendant who was a minor).
Cyberbullying was on the government’s mind well before this Act came into
being. In 2011, the government had appointed a Task Force to investigate the
issue:
6 This comment does not consider Part IV or Part V of the Act, which amended the
Education Act and the Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods Act respectively (and led
to the creation ofNova Scotia’s CyberSCANunit). These provisions were not directly at
issue in Crouch v. Snell. However, Justice McDougall, in striking down the entire Act,
commented at para. 220 that: ‘‘The remaining parts of the Act cannot survive on their
own. They are inextricably connected to the offending provisions, in particular the
definition of cyberbullying.”
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The Minister of Education first announced the Task Force in April
2011 in response to the growing public concern about bullying and
cyberbullying among Nova Scotia’s children and youth and the tragic
consequences that can flow from this misconduct. In particular, there
were some high-profile student suicides which appeared to be linked, at
least in part, to bullying and cyberbullying.7
The Task Force reported on February 29, 2012. Its recommendations for
legislative reform were directed at the Education Act and Regulations, and school
board policies.8 The focus was therefore on the school context — which, of
course, is the environment where Nova Scotians would have expected most
‘‘bullying” to occur.
And yet the Cyber-safety Act ended up with a much broader focus than the
schoolyard and communications between students. It did not just amend the
Education Act, but created a process for obtaining protection orders and
pursuing a claim tort of cyberbullying, applicable to all Nova Scotians.9
Even a cursory look at Hansard from April and May 201310 reveals why such
broad strokes were used. As has been widely reported, the Legislature was
responding to the tragic death of Rehtaeh Parsons a few weeks before (coming
only months after British Columbia teenager Amanda Todd tragically died),11
and passed the Act with all-party support. Minister Marilyn More opened the
Second Reading debate:
We’re all aware that a very tragic incident in our province has touched
a chord with every Nova Scotian. Over the last number of years, a
7 A.WayneMacKay,Chair, ‘‘Respectful andResponsibleRelationships: There’sNoApp
for That”— The Report of the Nova Scotia Task Force on Bullying and Cyberbullying





8 Task Force Report, ibid at 63-65.
9 The potential liability for parents of minors who have engaged in cyberbullying shows
that the Legislature was still thinking within the paradigm of school-age offenders and
victims, even though it legislatedmore broadly than that:Cyber-safety Act, supra note 1,
s. 3(2); s. 22(3)-(4).
10 During Second and Third Reading of Bill 61 (which became the Cyber-safety Act). See
Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, Hansard, 61st Assembly, 5th Sess, 13-22 (26 April
2013) beginning at 1482 (Second Reading). And see Nova Scotia, House of Assembly,
Hansard, 61st Assembly, 5th Sess, 13-32 (10 May 2013) beginning at 2513 (Third
Reading).
11 As summarized in Julia Nicol &Dominique Valiquet, Legislative Summary of Bill C-13:
An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act, the Competition Act and
the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, Publication No 41-2-C13-E (11
December 2013, revised 28 August 2014), online: Library of Parliament
<http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/
bills_ls.asp?Language=E&ls=c13&Parl=41&Ses=2&source=library_prb>.
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number of these incidents have happened, and there’s always been a
level of response and trying to improve the situation. But this last one, I
would have to say, created an anger and frustration and a general
collective will that we need to be a better province in terms of how we
look after one another. Nova Scotians want us to work together to
prevent situations like this from happening in the future.12
On Third Reading, Minister More noted that ‘‘emotions are high.”13 The
statute that resulted, then, was explicitly an emotional response to a tragic
incident.
While the Legislature had the 2012 Task Force Report in hand well before
this point, and legislators referred to it in debate, that Report covered a narrower
context than the Act ended up addressing. The Legislature perhaps did not give
itself the usual breathing room to fully contemplate the constitutionality of the
Act, particularly as it related to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the section 7 protection for
liberty.14
For privacy expert and Halifax lawyer David Fraser (who successfully
represented the respondent in Crouch v. Snell), enacting a statute in this
atmosphere made for bad law:
In my view, it was created in haste in the immediate, emotional
aftermath of the tragic death of a young woman who had been sexually
assaulted and had photos of the assault circulated around the
community. The government of the day – which was heading for an
election – was not willing to throw the police and the prosecution
service under the bus for no charges being laid, so instead created the
appearance of doing something by creating and passing a very poorly
executed law.15
In fact, Justice McDougall in Crouch v. Snell went so far as to call the Act a
‘‘colossal failure”16 for the relatively unlimited way in which it infringed freedom
of expression.
When the Legislature enacts such a sweeping piece of legislation and the
court strikes down the whole thing with immediate effect, it could impede the so-
12 Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, Hansard, 61st Assembly, 5th Sess, 13-22 (26 April
2013) at 1482 (Hon Marilyn More).
13 NovaScotia,House ofAssembly,Hansard, 61stAssembly, 5thSess, 13-32 (10May2013)
at 2513 (Hon Marilyn More).
14 Part I of theConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to theCanadaAct 1982 (UK), c. 11.
15 David Fraser, ‘‘Nova Scotia’s cyberbullying law declared to be unconstitutional and a
‘colossal failure’”, Privacy Law Blog (17 December 2015), online: <http://blog.priva-
cylawyer.ca/2015/12/nova-scotias-cyberbullying-law-declared.html>.
See also David Fraser, ‘‘New cyberbullying law half-baked”, The Chronicle Herald (15 August
2013), online: <http://thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/1147871-new-cyberbullying-law-half-
baked>.
16 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at para. 165.
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called ‘‘dialogue” between lawmakers and the judiciary about achieving
legislative objectives within constitutional boundaries. This is because there
may not be much nuance coming from either side to shape the dialogue about the
kind of tweaking and tailoring that would have made the Act better. So what
happens when both sides are so far apart?
It is certainly possible for a dialogue still to be had. If and when the
Legislature goes back to the drafting board, it can find guidance in Crouch v.
Snell. Despite calling the Act a ‘‘colossal failure,” Justice McDougall nevertheless
offered some important clues for developing any new cyberbullying statute.
II. A SUMMARY OF CROUCH V. SNELL—CLUES FOR A NEW ACT?
Two points should be made at the outset, on the assumption that the
Legislature will wish to enact a new statute based on a continuing desire to
address the kind of conduct that led Rehtaeh Parsons and Amanda Todd to end
their lives.
First, ‘‘cyberbullying” is not an ideal label for the type of behaviour and
communications that should be targeted. As Diana Whalen (now the
Honourable Diana Whalen) stated during Second Reading debates on the
Cyber-safety Act: ‘‘The very word ‘bullying’ might underestimate or somehow
downplay the seriousness of what we’re talking about. We’re talking about
activities that can and do ruin lives . . . ”17
The term is also inherently overbroad: ‘‘Bullying captures a wide range of
behaviour, most of which does not amount to criminal conduct, for example,
name calling, teasing, belittling and social exclusion.”18 This behaviour would
not, and should not necessarily result in civil liability either — at least not
liability that respects constitutional boundaries. Any new legislation should focus
on the worst forms of the behaviour known as ‘‘cyberbullying” and should track
accepted definitions of hate speech and harassment.
Secondly, a different and more descriptive label would also be consistent
with a widely applicable statute — i.e., one that is not limited to the school
context, but applies to all Nova Scotians whatever their age or stage of life. On
this note, Crouch v. Snell did not involve the ‘paradigm’ cyberbullying scenario
— say, one teenager sending hateful messages or sexualized images to another.
Instead, it was a dispute between two adults who were former business partners.
Ironically enough, their business was about helping ‘‘clients to better understand
and use social media.”19
17 Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, Hansard, 61st Assembly, 5th Sess, 13-22 (26 April
2013) at 1497 (Diana Whalen).
18 CCSO Cybercrime Working Group, Report to the Federal/Provincial/Territorial
Ministers Responsible for Justice and Public Safety, ‘‘Cyberbullying and the Non-
consensual Distribution of Intimate Images” (Department of Justice: June 2013) at 8,
online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/cndii-cdncii/pdf/cndii-cdncii-
eng.pdf>.
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The Applicant, Crouch, had applied for and received an ex parte protection
order under the Act in December 2014, (a) to prevent his former business
partner, the Respondent Snell, from cyberbullying him, and communicating with
or about him in any way, and (b) to require the Respondent to remove any direct
or indirect comments he’d made about the Applicant on social media sites.20
Both parties had been writing vague and not-so-vague posts about each other on
their social media, although Snell’s posts seemed to be more prolific.21
Applying the legislation on the assumption it was constitutional,22 Justice
McDougall ‘‘re-confirmed” the protection order that was initially issued by a
justice of the peace and then confirmed on review by the Supreme Court.23
However, Justice McDougall ultimately found the Act to be unconstitutional in
its entirety.
This comment will focus, first, on the substantive problems that the court
found with the definition of ‘‘cyberbullying,” before moving on to the procedural
problems with the protection order regime. The decision will also be examined
for directions that the Legislature could heed in drafting new legislation.
The broad definition of ‘‘cyberbullying” will be reproduced here for
convenience:
(b) ‘‘cyberbullying” means any electronic communication through the
use of technology including, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, computers, other electronic devices, social networks, text
messaging, instant messaging, websites and electronic mail, typically
repeated or with continuing effect, that is intended or ought reasonably
[to] be expected to cause fear, intimidation, humiliation, distress or
other damage or harm to another person’s health, emotional well-
being, self-esteem or reputation, and includes assisting or encouraging
such communication in any way[.]
As this definition was the foundation for the Act’s protection order
procedure and the new tort of cyberbullying, it was not a stretch for the court
to conclude that ‘‘the purpose of the Act is to control or restrict expression.” This
meant it violated the guarantee of freedom of expression in section 2(b) of the
Charter, which prima facie protects most expression short of violence. The Act
also, the court found, had ‘‘the effect of restricting expression that promotes at
least one of the core freedom of expression values. . .”24
19 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at paras. 17, 24.
20 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at paras. 22- 23; see also para. 73.
21 Detailed in Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at paras. 28-66.
22 After some procedural wrangling, the court considered this issue first; as the Attorney
General pointed out, theCharter challenge could have beenmoot if the protection order
was revoked (Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at para. 15).
23 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at paras. 2-3, 16, 22, 81.
24 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at paras. 112-113. See also para. 116. Italics added.
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To refresh, there are three core values: ‘‘individual self-fulfillment, truth
attainment, and political discourse.”25
The Attorney General argued that expression that meets the definition of
‘‘cyberbullying” is not aligned with any of these core values, so deserves less
protection under section 2(b). But, as Justice McDougall reiterated, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that most expression is protected under section 2(b)’s
broad umbrella, including ‘‘hate propaganda, defamatory libel, and publishing
false news. . .”26 So, as long as cyberbullying does not include actual ‘‘violence or
threats of violence,” it conveys sufficient meaning to warrant section 2(b)
protection.27
Pausing here: Justice McDougall acknowledged that ‘‘threats of violence”
will not attract section 2(b) protection. This is an important reminder for
legislative drafters, because much objectionable online expression is comprised of
threats of violence (for example, threats of rape).28
How else might the court’s section 2(b) analysis from Crouch influence the
development of a new statute? Admittedly, it must be difficult for legislators to
draft a definition of offending conduct knowing it is likely to violate the Charter
guarantee of freedom of expression, while looking ahead to justifying that
definition under section 1 of the Charter. But there is something to the Attorney
General’s submission that cyberbullying does nothing to advance the values
underlying freedom of expression — this idea should be explored by the
Legislature (and perhaps should have been given more consideration in Crouch v
Snell).
There is a growing recognition that expression that fits the definition of
cyberbullying can actually prevent attainment of the self-fulfillment, truth, and
political discourse objectives of section 2(b). By protecting the bully’s expression,
we may diminish the victim’s expression, and there is no gain for Charter rights
as a result.29 As the general counsel of Twitter has put it: ‘‘Freedom of expression
means little as our underlying philosophy if we continue to allow voices to be
silenced because they are afraid to speak up.”30
25 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at para. 104.
26 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at para. 102.
27 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at para. 106. See also Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human
Rights Tribunal, 2013 SCC 11, 2013 CarswellSask 73, 2013 CarswellSask 74 (S.C.C.) at
para. 112, reconsideration / rehearing refused 2013CarswellSask 236, 2013CarswellSask
237 (S.C.C.) [‘‘Whatcott”].
28 See generallyWestCoastLEAF, ‘‘#CyberMisogyny:Using and strengtheningCanadian
legal responses to gendered hate and harassment online” (June 2014), online: <http://
www.westcoastleaf.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2014-REPORT-CyberMisogy-
ny.pdf> [‘‘#CyberMisogyny report”].
29 ParaphrasingWhatcott, supra note 27 at para. 114.
30 Vijaya Gadde, ‘‘Twitter executive: Here’s how we’re trying to stop abuse while
preserving free speech”, The Washington Post (16 April 2015), online: PostEverything
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/04/16/twitter-executive-
heres-how-were-trying-to-stop-abuse-while-preserving-free-speech/>.
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West Coast LEAF has made a similar point about the online ‘‘harassment
and abuse” that often targets women and minorities, noting that ‘‘cyber
misogyny acts to silence women’s voices and push their perspectives out of the
discussion.”31 As stated in the West Coast LEAF report, cyberbullying is often
discriminatory — and therefore contrary to other Charter values and
protections:
. . . too often, analyses of the problem of ‘‘cyberbullying” erase its
sexist, racist, homophobic, transphobic, and otherwise discriminatory
nature, and ignore the context of power and marginalization in which it
occurs. The term ‘‘cyberbullying” also suggests that online harassment
and abuse is only a problem for children and youth, when we know that
misogynist hate speech and threatening behaviour online greatly affects
adult women, too. Research on ‘‘cyberbullying” clearly demonstrates
the extent to which members of minority ethnic groups, the LGBTQ
community, and people with disabilities are disproportionately targeted
for online bullying.
. . .
Misogynist and hateful expression is not the kind of free speech
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeks to protect; instead,
these forms of expression undermine women’s participation in public
spaces and discourse, violate their rights to equality and freedom from
discrimination, and contribute to a culture in which violence and hatred
against women are normalized. These outcomes are the very antithesis
of the reasons we protect freedom of expression in our Constitution. It
is a perversion of the intent of the Charter to use the rights it contains to
create a safe space for the exploitation and abuse of women and girls.32
It could be a progressive development for the section 2(b) jurisprudence to
include more of a cost-benefit, Charter values-based analysis, even though the
Supreme Court has maintained that one right (like equality) should not be used
to limit the scope of another (like expression).33 In any event, similar ideas are
captured in the section 1 analysis.
According to the court in Whatcott:
[65] The justification of a limit on freedom of expression under s. 1
requires a contextual and purposive approach. The values underlying
freedom of expression will inform the context of the violation: see
Taylor, Keegstra and Sharpe. McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority
in Sharpe, explained succinctly the values underlying freedom of
expression first recognized in Irwin Toy, being ‘‘individual self-
31 #CyberMisogyny report, supranote 28 at 8. See alsoWhatcott, supranote 27 at para. 104.
32 #CyberMisogyny report, supra note 28 at 7-8.
33 Whatcott, supra note 27 at para. 154. A full analysis of the consequences of doing so is
beyond the scope of this case comment.
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fulfilment, finding the truth through the open exchange of ideas, and
the political discourse fundamental to democracy” (para. 23).
[66] We are therefore required to balance the fundamental values
underlying freedom of expression (and, later, freedom of religion) in the
context in which they are invoked, with competing Charter rights and
other values essential to a free and democratic society, in this case, a
commitment to equality and respect for group identity and the inherent
dignity owed to all human beings: s. 15 of the Charter and R. v. Oakes,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at p. 136; Ross v. New Brunswick School District
No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, at para. 78; and Taylor, at pp. 916 and 920.
The court stated further:
Violent expression and expression that threatens violence does not fall
within the protected sphere of s. 2(b) of the Charter: R. v. Khawaja,
2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555, at para. 70. However, apart from
that, not all expression will be treated equally in determining an
appropriate balancing of competing values under a s. 1 analysis. That is
because different types of expression will be relatively closer to or
further from the core values behind the freedom, depending on the
nature of the expression. This will, in turn, affect its value relative to
other Charter rights, the exercise or protection of which may infringe
freedom of expression.34
For now, then, most of the work in a section 2(b) case will continue to be
done under section 1.35 It will be about justifying the limit on the expression,
rather than narrowing the prima facie protection for the expression. A key issue
in this respect will be minimal impairment — whether the legislative limit
infringes the right as little as possible.
Returning to Crouch v. Snell, Justice McDougall relied on the Supreme
Court’s decision inWhatcott for his minimal impairment analysis.36 This is where
he made the ‘‘colossal failure” comment:
[165] I need to consider all of the types of expression that may be
caught in the net of the Cyber-safety Act, and determine whether the
Act unnecessarily catches material that has little or nothing to do with
the prevention of cyberbullying: R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2 (CanLII),
[2001] S.C.J. No. 3 at para. 95. In this regard, the Cyber-safety Act, and
the definition of cyberbullying in particular, is a colossal failure. The
Attorney General submits that the Act does not pertain to private
communication between individuals, but rather, deals with ‘‘cyber
messages or public communications”. With respect, I find that the Act
restricts both public and private communications. Furthermore, the
Act provides no defences, and proof of harm is not required. These
34 Whatcott, supra note 27 at para. 112.
35 Whatcott, supra note 27 at para. 154.
36 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at para. 160.
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factors all culminate in a legislative scheme that infringes on s. 2(b) of
the Charter much more than is necessary to meet the legislative
objectives. The procedural safeguards, such as automatic review by this
Court and the respondent’s right to request a hearing, do nothing to
address the fact that the definition of cyberbullying is far too broad,
even if a requirement for malice was read in. Moir J.’s comments in
Self, supra [2015 NSSC 94] at para. 25, are instructive:
The next thing to note is the absence of conditions or qualifications
ordinarily part of the meaning of bullying. Truth does not appear
to matter. Motive does not appear to matter. Repetition or
continuation might (‘‘repeated or with continuing effect”) or might
not (‘‘typically”) matter.
[166] In conclusion, the Cyber-safety Act fails the ‘‘minimum
impairment” branch of the Oakes test.
This analysis reads like a list of ‘‘don’ts” for the Legislature. But the ‘‘don’ts”
can be translated into ‘‘dos” for legislators contemplating a new statute.
Whatcott provides further guidance here, as does a recent case about criminal
harassment; each will be discussed, culminating in a list of suggested changes to a
new definition of harmful online communications.
Whatcott involved complaints made under the hate speech provision of
Saskatchewan’s Human Rights Code, after the respondent distributed flyers (with
titles like ‘‘Keep Homosexuality out of Saskatoon’s Public Schools!”) alleged to
have ‘‘exposed persons to hatred and ridicule on the basis of their sexual
orientation.”37The provision defined hate speech as, inter alia, ‘‘any
representation . . . that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles
or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons on the basis of
a prohibited ground.”38
Justice Rothstein, for the court, read out ‘‘expression that ‘ridicules, belittles
or otherwise affronts . . . dignity’” as not ‘‘rationally connected to the legislative
purpose of addressing systemic discrimination of protected groups.”39
Of course, the Cyber-safety Act did not share this same legislative purpose,
but a similar idea should apply to any revamped definition — that the harm
caused by the impugned communications may need to rise above the level of
‘‘humiliation” or ‘‘damage or harm to . . . emotional well-being [or] self-esteem”
in order to pass constitutional muster.40 Hurt feelings will not be actionable.
37 Whatcott, supra note 27 at paras. 3-9.
38 SeeWhatcott, supra note 27 at para. 12.
39 Whatcott, supra note 27 at paras. 89 and 92.
40 The struck-down definition of ‘‘cyberbullying” also included ‘‘assisting or encouraging
such communication in any way.” This was not explored in any detail in Crouch v. Snell,
but may be another example of overbreadth that should be narrowed or perhaps even
eliminated in a new Act.
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The more recent and much publicized criminal case of R. v. Elliott is
enlightening, too.41 The defendant was acquitted of criminal harassment
following comments he had made to two women, who were feminist activists,
on Twitter.42
As reviewed in Elliott, the elements of criminal harassment can be
summarized as: (a) repeated communications, whether direct or indirect, that
(b) ‘‘caused the complainant to fear for her safety . . . ” where (c) this fear was
reasonable in all of the circumstances, and (d) the defendant ‘‘knew that the
complainant was harassed or was reckless or wilfully blind as to whether the
complainant was harassed.”43 Again, the focus is on a heightened type of
harm—fear—that the defendant intended or otherwise wanted to cause through
repeated communications. This is the kind of conduct that a new civil statute
should protect against.
This brief review of Whatcott and Elliott, then, suggests that concepts
underlying (a) hate speech provisions in human rights legislation and (b) criminal
harassment can offer valuable comparators for civil legislation intended to
address harmful online communications.44
Pulling together this discussion of Crouch, and also Whatcott and Elliott,
into a list of ‘‘dos” to guide development of a new statute, the Legislature could:
. Explicitly prohibit threats of violence that give rise to a ‘‘reasonable
apprehension of harm.”45
. Limit the definition to harmful communications. The communications
would be considered harmful because, due to the content of the
communications and/or the context in which they were made, the
communications reasonably cause(d) the applicant fear, severe emotional
distress, and/or physical or psychological harm.46
Adding the qualifier of ‘‘reasonably” would allow a subjective/objective
test to be applied. But it should be emphasized that the ‘‘reasonable
person” standard ‘‘must be informed by contemporary norms of
41 R. v. Elliott, 2016 ONCJ 35, 2016 CarswellOnt 631, [2016] O.J. No. 310 (Ont. C.J.).
42 On the facts of Elliott, the court found that the Crown had not established the
complainants’ fears were reasonable in all the circumstances, e.g. in light of the history of
their Twitter communications.
43 Elliott, supra note 41 at paras. 41-43 (QL).
44 See alsoAppendix I to theTaskForceReport, supra, which draws inspiration fromother
areas of law but, again, focuses on the education context: Chair WayneMacKay & Prof
Elizabeth Hughes, The Legal Dimensions of Bullying and Cyberbullying (20 February
2012), online: <http://antibullying.novascotia.ca/sites/default/files/Appendices%20-
t o% 2 0R e s p e c t f u l% 2 0 a n d%2 0R e s p o n s i b l e% 2 0 -% 2 0 T h e r e% 2 7 -
s%20No%20App%20for%20That%20-%20Report%20of%20the%20Task%20For-
ce.pdf>.
45 SeeWhatcott, supra note 27 at para. 132.
46 See also the #Cybermisogyny report, supra note 28 at 83.
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behaviour, including fundamental values such as the commitment to
equality provided for in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For
example, it would be appropriate to ascribe to the ordinary person
relevant racial characteristics if the accused were the recipient of a racial
slur . . . ”47
. Require the applicant to prove they have suffered one of these listed
consequences, and that the harm was caused by the impugned commu-
nications. This is narrower than a requirement to show that the
communication was ‘‘intended or ought reasonably to be expected” to
cause one of the listed harms. It would involve showing that it actually did.
. Clearly specify the requisite mental element. This mental element should
be linked to the actionable harms that may be suffered by the applicant:
Intent to cause the applicant fear, severe emotional distress, and/or
physical or psychological harm, or wilful blindness or recklessness
regarding that outcome.48
. Limit the definition to repeated/continued communications (unless there
are exigent or extreme circumstances). This would remove the ‘‘ . . . or
with continuing effect” part of the definition, which is redundant in light
of the harm requirement suggested above.
. Provide for defences if determined to be appropriate (e.g. that the
communications were not actually directed at the applicant; were made in
service of a broader public interest; etc.).
This returns the analysis to a suggestion made earlier: that any revised statute
should target ‘‘the worst of the worst” — the extreme online communications49
that align with accepted definitions of hate speech and/or harassment.
A tightened-up, tailored definition would then provide a more solid
foundation for an applicant seeking a protection order and/or a plaintiff suing
in tort (assuming a fresh statute would also include a similar Part I and Part II).
Moving to procedure — can we take any clues from Crouch v. Snell
regarding what a new protection order regime should look like?50 This comment
proposes that the ability to obtain a protection order is, presumptively, a good
thing, as a productive and efficient way of addressing harmful and harassing
online communications. If it is done properly, of course. As the West Coast
47 R. v. Tran, 2010 SCC 58, 2010 CarswellAlta 2281, 2010 CarswellAlta 2282 (S.C.C.) at
para. 34.
48 See e.g. Self v. Baha’i, 2015 NSSC 94, 2015 CarswellNS 224 (N.S. S.C.) at para.. 31.
49 This comment does not challenge the technological side of the Legislature’s definition of
‘‘cyberbullying” but uses the catch-all term ‘‘online” to encompass electronic commu-
nications over the internet and/or cellphone networks (e.g. for SMS messages). Any
updated technical definition will have to be broad enough to encompass new and
emerging technologies.
50 This section will also use the terms ‘‘applicant” and ‘‘respondent.”
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LEAF report on cyber misogyny points out, civil procedures can empower
victims of harmful online communications, who would not have control over
criminal proceedings but retain some measure of control in civil court.51
Nevertheless, Justice McDougall was extremely critical of the protection
order procedure in the Act, including the fact that an order could be obtained ex
parte.52 Another procedural problem for Justice McDougall was that the failure
to comply with a protection order was a summary conviction offence that carried
the possibility of imprisonment.53 The liberty interest protected under section 7
of the Charter was therefore threatened, so the Court had to go on to consider
whether this possible deprivation of liberty was consistent with the principles of
fundamental justice.54 It was not.
In particular, Justice McDougall found, the Act was arbitrary and
procedurally unfair; overbroad; and vague. Framing the procedural discussion
in terms of these principles of fundamental justice, Justice McDougall concluded:
. Arbitrariness: An applicant’s ability to proceed under the Act without
notice to the alleged cyberbully was ‘‘not rationally connected to the Act’s
objective” of providing a dedicated procedure to address cyberbullying; ex
parte proceedings were not necessary to achieve that goal — especially
because the Legislature could have limited ex parte proceedings to, say,
‘‘emergencies or other extraordinary circumstances”55 and ‘‘situations
where the respondent’s identity is not known or easily identifiable”, but
did not.56 For similar reasons, the scheme also did not accord with the
principles of fundamental justice that protect procedural fairness.
Yet it is not clear why an ex parte application process is inherently
problematic, at least if the possibility of imprisonment is removed from
the statute; it is a notion quite common to civil procedure. If the
respondent will be (a) served with any resulting protection order,57 and (b)
given an opportunity to challenge the order (e.g. by raising one of the new
defences that could be included),58then there would be a stronger
connection between that procedure and the need to protect the applicant
from further harmful communications. (This connection would only be
stronger in light of the more harm-based definition discussed above.)
51 #Cybermisogyny report, supra note 28 at 26.
52 NB: JusticeMcDougall applied theOakes test under section 1of theCharter after finding
the section 2(b) violation. He then applied many of the same factors to his section 7
analysis. This case comment adjusts the analytical order, for conceptual clarity.
53 Cyber-safety Act, supra note 1, s. 19.
54 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at paras. 179-181.
55 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at para. 155.
56 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at para. 152.
57 Cyber-safety Act, supra note 1, s. 11.
58 Cyber-safety Act, supra note 1, ss. 12-13.
MINDING THE GAP: NOVA SCOTIA’S CYBER-SAFETY ACT 169
. Overbreadth: Justice McDougall’s concerns about the ‘‘net” being cast
‘‘too broadly, and failing to require proof of intent or harm, or to
delineate any defences” were discussed earlier, in proposing limits on the
definition of harmful online communications (or whatever new term might
be adopted). Procedurally speaking, these concerns of overbreadth could
be minimized in an additional way, at least vis-à-vis the liberty interest
protected under section 7, if there was no possibility of imprisonment. It is
not clear from Crouch v. Snell why the government thought this to be
necessary in the first place.
. Vagueness: The problem here was not the definition of cyberbullying itself
— although this definition was certainly problematic, as has been
reviewed. The problem was that a justice of the peace who issued a
protection order had to not only accept that the respondent has
cyberbullied, but must also have had ‘‘reasonable grounds to believe the
respondent will engage in” cyberbullying in the future— even though there
were no criteria in the Act to guide this preventative exercise.59
In that respect, on what grounds should a protection order be issued? Section
8 of the Cyber-safety Act provided:
Grounds for protection order
8 Upon application, a justice may make a protection order, where the
justice determines, on a balance of probabilities, that
(a) the respondent engaged in cyberbullying of the subject; and
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent will
engage in cyberbullying of the subject in the future.
As mentioned, section 8(b) was constitutionally problematic because it
provided no criteria to inform the justice’s exercise of discretion. But it may also
have been redundant, from a practical perspective. If the applicant proves, on the
normal civil standard of a balance of probabilities, that ‘‘the respondent engaged
in” harmful online communications directed against the applicant then should
the applicant not be entitled to a remedy?
Perhaps the real problem is the nature of the remedy. Note the vast array of
conditions that a justice could include in a protection order:
Protection order may include
9 (1) A protection order may include any of the following provisions
that the justice considers necessary or advisable for the protection of
the subject:
59 Crouch v. Snell, supra note 3 at paras. 125-137, 197.
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(a) a provision prohibiting the respondent from engaging in
cyberbullying;
(b) a provision restricting or prohibiting the respondent from,
directly or indirectly, communicating with or contacting the subject
or a specified person;
(c) a provision restricting or prohibiting the respondent from,
directly or indirectly, communicating about the subject or a
specified person;
(d) a provision prohibiting or restricting the respondent from using
a specified or any means of electronic communication;
(e) an order confiscating, for a specified period or permanently,
any electronic device capable of connecting to an Internet Protocol
address associated with the respondent or used by the respondent
for cyberbullying;
(f) an order requiring the respondent to discontinue receiving
service from an Internet service provider;
(g) any other provision that the justice considers necessary or
advisable for the protection of the subject.
(2) A justice may make a protection order for a period not exceeding
one year.
Several of these possible conditions stand out as especially problematic in
their overbreadth, notably, (d), (e), and (f).60 Surely the ultimate desired remedy
is a combination of (b) and (c): making the harmful communications that have
been directed at and/or about the applicant stop — and ensuring that any
offending comments are removed from online or physical spaces. Going beyond
that remedy to prohibit the respondent from using the internet seems excessive
and procedurally unfair, whether or not his or her liberty interest is at stake.
In the end, though, Justice McDougall’s procedural concerns overlapped
with his substantive concerns about the overly broad definition of
‘‘cyberbullying,” so it is hoped that a refined definition of harmful online
communications would alleviate some of the procedural problems.
III. CONCLUSION
This topic elicits passionate debate on both sides: those willing to protect
freedom of expression at most costs, and those seeking to curb certain expression
to prevent cyberbullying. A new Cyber-safety Act must strike a reasonable
balance between these two legitimate positions, with a more comprehensive
appreciation of what is constitutionally permissible from a substantive and a
procedural perspective. The Legislature should mind the gap in the law — but act
reasonably, and responsively, in filling it.
60 And this is without addressing the potential procedural complications of involving
internet service providers.
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